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SPECIAL FEATURE
PLANNING FOR EFFECTIVE RISK
MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR
STADIUM AND ARENA
MANAGEMENT
BERNARD P. MALOY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A stadium or an arena's legal liability for a personal injury claim is
generally predicated upon the facility's failure to meet minimum standards
of "safety, suitability, or sanitation."' Significant concerns regarding facil-
ity safety started to manifest themselves with the abolition or limitation of
immunity, and the enactment of Tort Claim statutes. Consequently, man-
agement interest in risk management programs grew as the specter of legal
liability loomed over public facilities.2 Many facility risk management pro-
grams were implemented with the specific purpose of preventing or reduc-
ing personal injury risks.3
It is not uncommon for personal injury attorneys to trace the failure to
provide minimum facility standards to the seemingly enduring incom-
petencies of the facility management. Often, management incompetency is
the result of a lackadaisical management attitude toward risk management.
In addition, sometimes it is caused by the inherent constraints of the facil-
ity's organizational structure. In other words:
1. Facility management incompetency is usually evident from manage-
ment's misconduct regarding its own safety policies or procedures. That is,
management has failed to communicate safety responsibility to its staff, has
* Assistant Professor of Sports Management and Communications, University of Michigan.
B.A. Wheeling, 1969; J.D. Notre Dame, 1972; M.S. Ohio, 1985.
1. Francis Gregory & Arthur H. Goldsmith, The Sports Spectator as Plaintiff, 16 TRIAL 26,
28 (March, 1980). For purposes of this article, which is primarily addressed to the stadium and
arena industry, the term "facility" may be substituted for "stadium or arena" for purposes of
brevity.
2. BEITY VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE ENTITIES vol. 2, ch. 23, at 1-2.
3. Id. at 3.
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disregarded or neglected proper safety procedures, or has imprudently dele-
gated safety obligations; or,
2. Facility management has adopted the traditional organizational
structure of American business which tends to be hierarchal in form and
militaristic in style. Therefore, it works within an organizational structure
which has been known to stunt the flow of information, doubt the virtue of
employee motivation, and inhibit staff participation in the work place.' In
many cases, risk management incompetency is not the result of malicious
intent. As noted, it may be the unfortunate consequence of managerial atti-
tudes which are bred in a hierarchal organizational structure. That struc-
ture subscribes to vertical levels of communication, and the separation of
tasks and duties.'
The thrust of this article is to encourage American stadium and arena
managers to utilize non-traditional organizational structure and manage-
ment methods when implementing their risk management programs. This
article suggests that "effective" risk management is the result of a number
of steps. First, effective risk management requires an awareness that risk
identification is only one process of a comprehensive risk management pro-
gram, not its entire purpose. Second, effective risk management means that
legal concepts which focus on the risk management process should be sim-
plified to three simple concepts: legal knowledge, instruction, and warning.
Third, the management component of a facility risk management program
requires open organizational communication focusing on participatory risk
management. Finally, all steps need to be integrated in order to provide the
most comprehensive program of facility safety and protection.
II. THE RISK IDENTIFICATION PROCESS
The identification of facility risks is often initiated by assessing facility
functions.' There are a number of methods by which stadium or arena
4. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PRACTICES 137-
147 (1974). Drucker alleges that the government, higher education, the armed services, and the
health industry are growing faster than American business He distinguishes American business as
that industry which produces products. The goal of the service industry is to be efficient and
control costs. By its nature, it is bureaucratic; and, it is not "effective" which is the distinctive
aspect of American business. Id.
5. ROSABETH Moss KANTER, THE CHANGEMASTERS: INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 28-29 (1983). The author terms "segmentalization" as
the foundation upon which hierarchal organizational structure is built. Its effects are the isolation
of actions, events, and problems in the organization. Segmentalization "means that each [organi-
zational] segment works independently, with minimum need for communication." Id.
6. See RICHARD B. FLYNN, PLANNING FACILITIES FOR ATHLETICS, PHYSICAL EDUCATION,
AND RECREATION 131 (1985). Flynn's risk identification process begins with concepts rather
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functions can be appraised. First, there are the risks created by the interac-
tion of the spectator with the facility which include:
1. Areas of Heavy Use, such as entrances and exits, concourses, por-
tals, rest rooms, and concession areas, present safety problems simply be-
cause they are places where fans congregate. There is always a safety
concern when large groups of people congregate or cluster around a heavy
traffic area.7
2. Areas of Specialized Use, such as toilets, sinks, concession tables,
and doors create risk management problems due to the unorthodox means
in which they may be used. Many sports fans open doors by pushing on the
glass rather than the handle, are heavy-handed with toilet attachments, or
lean on rest room sinks and tables while waiting their turns.
3. Areas of Expectation means that fans expect that their seats are in
proper working condition, that facility floors will be reasonably clean, and
that concession products are safe and edible. These spectator expectations
are justified since there is little that fans can do to protect themselves from
the related risks.'
Another way of evaluating facility use is to examine known or antici-
pated defects in the facility itself which may include:
1. Roofing Systems are a major concern since they can stimulate or
accelerate the deterioration of the facility.9 The effects of leakage always
poses a facility risk.
2. Steps, though generally installed according to city, county, or state
building code, are always affected by the type and location of lighting, va-
than specifics. For example, stadiums and arenas should "provide adequate storage space." Ade-
quate storage has many meanings. From the legal perspective, what is adequate depends upon the
circumstances. From a management viewpoint, adequacy is measured by one's experience and
knowledge regarding needs. Therefore, to be safely understood and implemented, "providing ade-
quate storage space" would require communication between facility management and staff.
7. Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (A spectator is as-
saulted by unidentified persons while exiting a Minneapolis arena after a wrestling match); Green-
ville Memorial Auditorium v. Martin, 301 S.C. 242, 391 S.E.2d 546 (1990) (A glass bottle is
thrown into a crowd at a rock concert); see also, Annotation, Injury to Customer by Crowd, 20
A.L.R.2d 12 (1951).
8. See Lindgren v. Voge, 260 Minn. 262, 109 N.W.2d 754 (1961) (a flooded rest room floor
and a broken flushbox cause a spectator injury); see also League of Minnesota Cities Ins. Trust v.
City of Coon Rapids, 446 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (spectators at an ice arena are
injured from pollutants discharged from the Zamboni); see also Annen v. McNab, 192 Ill. App.3d
711, 548 N.E.2d 1383 (1990) (child is injured when a rest room sink falls on her).
9. RICHARD B. FLYNN, supra note 6, at 114-119; See also Monex, Inc. v. Anthony A. Nunes,
Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Sen. 2d 74, 576 A.2d 1206 (R.I. 1990) (Products liability claim regarding a 2-
ply built-up roofing system).
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tied height and width of risers, length of handrails, and the type of step
covering.' 0
3. Floor surface is a critical area because most stadiums and arenas
host various types of events and convocations which require a variety of
surfaces and coverings. These can present multiple risks and hazards for
spectators and participants."1
A third approach to facility use is to review the services provided by the
facility, including:
1. Trash or garbage created from concession and souvenir sales is a pri-
mary area of concern to facility operators because it literally covers a large
area of spectator use: parking lots, entrances and exits, concourses and hall-
ways, toilets, portals, rows, and seats. 12
2. Alcohol is a always a facility problem. Obviously, if the stadium or
arena serves alcohol, then strict liability may attach under applicable dram
shop laws. 3 In most instances, it is alcohol-induced conduct which is the
major hazard to spectators and participants.1 4
3. Security and Supervision are always risk concerns for facilities be-
cause spectators generally believe that most personal injuries could have
been prevented if the facility had taken greater care to provide adequate
security or supervision. 5
Nevertheless, the process of generating lists of facility risks is only one
step or process of a risk management program. Unfortunately, it often is
accepted as the entire plan. It is impractical, if not impossible, to list or
categorize the potential hazards and risks that may be found in a stadium or
arena. In order to list every potential facility risk, one would have to con-
sider all the potential sources of injury from the design, construction, main-
tenance, operation, or administration of the facility itself. Add to that all
10. Jacobs v. Commonwealth Highland Theatres, Inc., 738 P.2d 6 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
11. RICHARD B. FLYNN, supra note 6 at 119, 130.
12. Maryland Maintenance Service, Inc. v. Palmieri, 559 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(Spectator slipped on a wet substance on the grandstand floor of a race track).
13. Allen v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 216 N.J. Super. 189, 523 A.2d 262,
cert. denied, 527 A.2d 472 (1987) (Rutgers University is immune from the claim of a student who
became intoxicated at a football game. Although university personnel at Rutgers Stadium failed
to follow the procedures for administering to intoxicated fans, the university did not sell or pro-
vide the intoxicants. Therefore, strict liability under New Jersey's Dram Shop law did not apply).
14. Bearman v. University of Notre Dame, 453 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. App. 1983) (A football fan
exiting Notre Dame Stadium is injured by two intoxicated fans). See also Francis X. Dealy, Win
at Any Cost 125-143 (1990).
15. Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 104 N.J. 80, 514 A.2d 1323
(1986) (a fan exiting Giants Stadium at the Meadowlands is knocked down by some young men
who are engaged in a game of roughhouse). See also Betty van der Smissen, supra note 2, 163
("Lack of inadequate supervision is the most common allegation of negligence").
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the potential risks which have not yet revealed themselves in the facility.
There are other problems associated with risk identification. For example,
the size of the facility, the ages and maturity of its users, and the types of
events hosted in the facility. In short, there are so many variables involved
that all the possible risks of injury in a facility cannot be adequately and
prudently listed. For that very reason, any administrative or management
belief that risk management can be reduced to a simple check list is naive.
Airline pilots and crews use checklists in order to assure that proper
procedures are followed so that the aircraft safely takes off, flies, and lands.
The safe operation of the aircraft, however, does not begin by putting an
untrained pilot in the cockpit with a check list. Safe operation begins with a
purpose, communication, and training. The same is true with the safe oper-
ation of a stadium or arena. A risk identification list merely facilitates the
risk management program. It does not replace the mission, communica-
tion, or training required for a competent risk management plan.
Sooner or later, a risk list will have to be produced for the facility risk
management program. However, the list should result from research in the
construction, maintenance, and use of the facility as well as analysis of the
facility management program. The results of facility risk management ap-
praisals usually focus on the legal obligations or duties of the stadium or
arena. Ultimately, those liability concerns should be reduced to three sim-
ple legal obligations: legal knowledge, instruction, and warning. This pro-
cess of consolidating a facility's legal duties to the three legal obligations
will clarify the procedure for risk identification.
III. COMMUNICATING LEGAL CONCEPTS
Stadiums and arenas have to sell themselves to survive in business.
They cannot merely be concerned with the operation, maintenance, and ad-
ministration of the facility but, equally, they are dependent on their market-
ing, promotion, and public relations. For that reason, the law distinguishes
them from facilities which are merely open to business visitors or custom-
ers, such as office buildings or stores. Stadiums and arenas are legally
termed places of amusement. That distinction is made for facilities which
invite the public to use their premises and charge a fee for entry. 16 The
legal obligations owed by places of amusement are more strictly applied
than those of a facility which merely invites public use. It is not uncom-
mon, therefore, for facility risk management manuals to preface their risk
16. Lindgren v. Voge, 260 Minn. 262, 272, 109 N.W.2d 754, 761 (1961); see also, Annotation,
Liability of Owner or Operator of Theater or Other Amusement to Patron Assaulted by Another
Patron, 75 A.L.R.3d 441 (1977).
1991]
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identification process with a brief explanation of tort liability, especially the
law of negligence. 17
Many lawyers have difficulty explaining legal concepts in anything other
than the language of the law. It is important that risk management manu-
als avoid explaining legal concepts in "legalese" or applying examples ex-
clusively in legal settings. In a risk management program, the language of
safety has to be expressed in terms understood by the facility management
and staff. Spectators and participants of all ages have to be directed, in-
structed, and guided in safe facility use by common language. Therefore, a
more simplified method of risk identification, utilizing legal concepts, could
concentrate its attention to the legal obligations of knowledge, instruction,
and warning. These are not the only legal obligations with which a facility
needs to concern itself.18 However, a review of the many areas of risk iden-
tification discussed in the previous section should reveal that the reasonable
application of legal knowledge, instruction, or warning will alleviate a ma-
jority of the risks identified.
Legal knowledge is not a term distinguishable from the word "knowl-
edge." Legal knowledge refers to the decision to apply knowledge. The
word knowledge is defined as "[a]cquaintance with facts, truths, or princi-
ples, as from study or investigation." 1 9 In more relevant risk management
parlance, knowledge might be defined as experience and expertise in facility
risk appraisal. Legal knowledge is its judicial expectation. It is the expecta-
tion that a stadium or arena manager will use his or her knowledge to main-
tain a reasonably safe facility. The facility whose manager has failed to use
his or her knowledge to keep the facility safe will be liable for personal
injuries. Legal knowledge is also the expectation that a facility manager
will expand his or her knowledge of risks through continuing education,
industry journals, and trade publications. Additionally, legal knowledge is
the expectation that the facility manager will regularly inspect the facility in
order to be prepared for any unexpected or undiscovered problems that
may threaten the facility's patrons. Finally, legal knowledge is the expecta-
17. See IAN MCGREGOR & JOSEPH MACDONALD, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL FOR
SPORT AND RECREATION ORGANIZATIONS 2-21 (1990).
18. There is a legal obligation to supervise facilities. That obligation may be implicit, how-
ever, in the legal duties to instruct and warn. See BETTY VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 2, at 221-
233.
19. THE LIVING WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 531
(1974).
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tion that a facility manager will prudently react to spectator risks once they
are discovered.2"
Facility managers can react to their knowledge of facility risks by in-
structing or warning spectators about the safe use of the stadium or arena.
Safe facility use depends upon instruction. From the time a spectator ar-
rives at the facility, he or she relies on instructions regarding traffic flow,
where to park, which entrance to use, where to sit, where the concession
and rest rooms are located, and where to smoke. Obviously, instructions
play a major part of effective facility risk management. The risks associated
with instruction are generally created from the manner in which the in-
structions are communicated, not their content. Facility communication
has to be sensitive to senior citizens who may have hearing difficulties, to
children whose attention may be directed elsewhere, and to fans whose in-
terests are directed to the field of play, not to their own personal
protection.2"
The legal obligation to warn of risks is related to the instruction con-
cept. In regard to facility risks, the functions of warnings are to instruct, to
inform, and to warn.22 To be effective, the warning message must be rea-
sonably conveyed. For example, a "do not run" sign merely posted over a
portal may not be reasonable warning for an 11-year-old spectator anxious
to get to his or her seat. Warnings should always be posted for any facility
conditions or problems which cannot be immediately remedied. For exam-
ple, if the source of flooding of a rest room floor cannot be located or
stopped, a warning of the danger together with an alternative plan for rest
room relief should be communicated to spectators needing those services.
The importance of legal knowledge, instruction, and warning cannot be
overemphasized. For example, the law recognizes that spectators assume
some risks of injury or may contribute to their own injury by their inatten-
tion. Further, the law is clear that spectators assume most of the risks in-
herent to the type of event they are attending.23 Nevertheless, before the
court weighs the contributory actions of an injured spectator, it will gener-
20. Maryland Maintenance Service, Inc. v. Palmieri, 559 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
21. BETTY VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 2, at vol. 2, ch. 24 at 22-26 (conducting activities or
managing services is based on giving instructions).
22. Id. at 37-44.
23. Friedman v. Houston Sports Association, 731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (An 11-
year-old child assumed the risk of injury from a foul ball at a baseball game); Accold Chareas v.
Township High School District No. 214, 195 Ill. App.3d 540, 553 N.E.2d 23 (1990) (A youngster
assumes the risk of injury when he stands inside the fence at a tennis match instead of sitting in
the bleachers provided).
1991]
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ally look to see if the facility knew of the risk and failed to instruct the
spectator or did not effectively warn the spectator.24
Legal knowledge, instruction, and warning can serve as a sufficient basis
for a facility risk management program. If the management and staff em-
brace and apply the three concepts, then the facility will have a foundation
for its risk identification process. However, the three legal concepts share a
common trait which first has to be competently managed before the legal
concepts can be utilized effectively. That element is communication. "The
effectiveness of any risk management program is in direct proportion to the
effectiveness of communications, for when communication is non-existent,
incomplete, or inadequate in any way, the program becomes inoperable and
the risks, then, are not reduced as they might be."2 5 Communication is the
common element of legal knowledge, instruction, and warning. The com-
munication between management and staff, as well as communication be-
tween staff and facility patrons is vitally important to a facility's competent
performance of the three legal tasks. It should be apparent that the "risk"
component of facility risk management is rooted in the legal concepts which
direct the process of risk identification. It should be equally evident that
the "management" part of facility risk management relies on effective com-
munication. Communication is not a legal concept. It is a social concept
and a business concept. As a business concept, the effectiveness of commu-
nication can be thwarted by managerial attitudes, or limited by the confines
of organizational structure.26
IV. MANAGING COMMUNICATION
Recently, American business has been the target of some critics for its
multi-tiered organizational structure.2 7 Other criticism places the blame for
the apparent deterioration of American business on the incompetence, even
fraudulent intent, of management.2" Certainly the savings and loan crisis,
24. BETTY VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 2, vol. 2, ch. 15 at 11 ("In regard to assumption of
risk, concern is with knowingly encountering danger, which is to be contrasted with negligently
encountering risk").
25. Id. at vol. 2, ch. 24 at 20.
26. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE 121-125
(1982). (Corporate projects often become mired in corporate bureaucracy. The authors suggest
that getting things done in an organization requires informal, open communication between man-
agement and stafl and, positive reinforcement from management to stafl).
27. MARK H. MCCORMACK, WHAT THEY DON'T TEACH You AT HARVARD BUSINESS
SCHOOL 175 (1984). (McCormack cites a former Ford executive who termed that company's
organizational structure as a "wall of molasses - nothing gets in, nothing gets out, nothing goes
up, or goes sideways, and is too slow to go down.")
28. See ROBERT LEVERING, A GREAT PLACE TO WORK 239-253 (1988).
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American auto manufacturing woes, or the impending insurance crisis serve
as strong testaments for those opinions. It is unclear, however, whether
organizational structure and management incompetence are separable, or
whether they are interrelated. It is exasperating to discover whether orga-
nizational structure or inferior management is the cause of poor manage-
ment. The argument begins to take on shades of the chicken or the egg
dispute. Nevertheless, managerial attitude and organizational structure are
vital elements which greatly affect the communication within any organiza-
tion. Since communication has been identified as the key element of a facil-
ity risk management plan, it is essential to discover how it is best adapted to
the organizational work place.
It has been posed that today's predominant office structure is really
nothing more than the organized assembly line adopted for the early 20th
Century mass production.2 9 Many modem business persons accept that
business organization should be a tiered structure. Its levels and processes
are comparable and similar to the military organizational structure.3 0 A
feature of the hierarchal structure is command from the top down. An
important criticism of that command structure is the reservation of infor-
mation by the higher management levels of the organization. Peters and
Waterman asserted that a dominant feature of their "excellent" companies
was the loose flow of shared information. "Another of the more striking
characteristics of the excellent companies is the apparent absence of a rig-
idly followed chain of command. Of course, the chain of command does
exist for big decisions, but it is not used much for day-to-day communica-
tion."'" It is maintained that management's reluctance to share informa-
tion stunts employee participation in the organizational mission or process,
and permits little employee autonomy over the job process. This is usually
reflected by management's desire that employee duties and responsibilities
be standardized into simple, repetitive tasks. Unfortunately, those corol-
laries seem to result in minimal employee performance.3 2
It could be assumed that the hierarchal organizational structure inhibits
communication from the top to the bottom simply because of the difficulty
29. Id. at 48-49 and 79-89.
30. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 7.
31. Id. at 262; (Peters and Waterman also cite a Fortune magazine article which notes that
sharing information at the "shop floor" level is the single most important act in bridging the gap
between management and staff).
32. See ROBERT LEVERING, supra note 28, at 72-76; see also THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT
H. WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 39 (Authors present Japanese organizational beliefs which rec-
ognize job performance as an organizational natural resource and, which, view organization and
employees as synonymous).
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in transmitting information through the levels of management. In other
words, not all communication problems may be the result of close-mouthed
or patronizing managers. The problems may result merely from the inher-
ent problems of organizational structure. If the organization designs com-
munication to flow from top to bottom, the hierarchal structure becomes an
impediment. In addition, if information is supposed to flow from the bot-
tom to the top as well, its dissemination faces similar hierarchal obstacles.
A stadium or arena whose administration is organized along traditional
organization lines with multi-layered, hierarchal management should be
aware of these communication impediments. This is not to suggest that the
free flow of information cannot exist in a hierarchal organization. Nor does
it mean that a stadium or arena management process is guilty by association
merely because it has adopted a layered structure. It does mean, however,
that facility management framed in the multi-tiered organization must be
managed by uniquely open people. The hierarchal organization places
greater emphasis on the quality of the management personnel to facilitate a
good communication process. The evidence suggests that hierarchal orga-
nizations usually do not breed such managers.
Management incompetence is not easily defined. Actually, it probably
belongs in the eyes of the beholder. Management which fails to maximize
profits and dividends may be viewed as incompetent by the shareholders.33
Further, management which fails to effectively plan, organize, staff, control,
and lead employees in the performance of their tasks may be measured as
incompetent by experts and consultants.3 4 Management which has little
respect for the individual is probably considered incompetent by employ-
ees.35 In any event, management has many antagonists when it attempts to
define its purpose and goals. In regard to service industry management,
however, Peter Drucker defends the quality of management, and blames
perceived incompetencies on the structure of the organization:
If service institutions cannot be run and managed by men of normal
and fairly low endowment; if, in other words, we cannot organize
the task so that it will be done adequately by men who only try hard,
it cannot be done at all... there is no reason to believe that business
managers, put in control of service institutions, would do better than
33. ROBERT LEVERING, supra note 28, at 239.
34. See HAROLD KooNTz & HIENZ WEIHRICH, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGEMENT, 22-24 (5th
ed. 1990); see also MURRY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INc. 20-21 (1990) (Sperber questions the
management expertise of many college athletic directors whose main qualification appears to be
their participation as a player or coach in football).
35. ROBERT LEVERING, supra note 28, at 225-226 (Author poses that bad workplaces have
management which lives by arbitrary rules, permits abusive supervision, and generally has little
regard for employee well-being).
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the 'bureaucrats.' Indeed, we know that they immediately become
bureaucrats themselves.36
The bottom line, unfortunately, is that many facility risk management pro-
grams implemented in a layered organizational structure, with its inherent
bureaucratic management, will be ineffective. Stadium and arena risk man-
agement cannot succeed because communication, so important to the risk
management concept, is curtailed.
It is equally apparent, however, that change in the organizational struc-
ture, or in the method of management, starts with management. It is not a
task for which employees or staff are held accountable. If communication is
going to be the main ingredient in organizational structure, or management
philosophy, then it is a charge which management alone has to bear.
In performing these essential functions [leadership, direction, objec-
tives, and organization], management everywhere faces the same
problems. It has to organize work for productivity, it has to lead the
worker toward productivity and achievement. It is responsible for
the social impact of its enterprise. Above all, it is responsible for
producing the results - whether economic performance, student
learning, or patient care - for the sake of which the institution
exists.37
In the late 1970s, many changes were made by Preston Trucking.3 8 The
focus of that change was to make the company more competitive in an
increasingly difficult transportation market. Most of the difficulty centered
on communication. At the time of the change, employee performance and
morale was at an all-time low. Levering noted that open communication
became a natural by-product of the company's decision to change. More
importantly, the change came strictly from management. Employees were
not called upon to make any change, were not asked to forego any estab-
lished union privileges, and were not given "lip service" regarding their ef-
forts for company growth.3 9 Management alone was required to change.
For example, Levering discussed the positive reinforcement method
wherein a manager had to find four good things to say regarding an em-
ployee's performance for every one criticism.4' In establishing vital com-
36. See DRUCKER, supra note 4, at 139.
37. Id. at 17.
38. ROBERT LEVERING, supra note 28, at 151.
39. PETERS & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 238-241 (Lip service is a management gimmick.
It is used by management, usually in times of crisis, to inspire employees to renew their efforts,
expresses management's concern for the employees well-being, and directs that positive change
will result if each side makes a concerted effort. Implicitly, it is management's placing some
blame for its own failure on the employees).
40. ROBERT LEVERING, supra note 28, at 139-161.
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munication, and recapturing employee performance, the program was a
success. However, management did not readily buy into the precept that it
had to change, nor did the program guarantee future company success.
The idea that Preston management alone had to change its employee
communication and interaction was not easily accepted. One-quarter of the
management structure quit because of the change in management philoso-
phy.4 When management training is directed to managerial functions
within a multitiered organizational structure, it would be difficult for a
manager to accept less than the absolute authority he or she held. How-
ever, if communication is to be a shared process, management has to learn
the processes of employee participation. At Preston, it was also realized
that the new management emphasis was not a guaranteed success. The
Preston story had to be repeated everyday. The communication of goals,
purpose, and procedures became an everyday effort. It required the con-
stant commitment of management.
V. INTEGRATING THE RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN
One of the methods adopted by management, as a means of integrating
risk management programs, has been the appointment of a risk manager.
The role of a risk manager can be a positive one for the stadium or arena.
However, such an appointment does pose some problems. First, if the posi-
tion is merely a delegated duty which management does wish to deal with,
then it will fail due to management's own incompetency. Second, the posi-
tion may be just another layer or tier in the organizational structure which
means that the flow of information will have another obstacle. Therefore,
the success of a risk management program should not be left solely with the
appointment of a risk manager. A successful program depends on its inte-
gration of risk management communication within the organization.
There are a number of steps required for an integrated risk management
program. They utilize each of the lessons reviewed concerning risk identifi-
cation, the applicable legal concepts and, more importantly, an open or par-
ticipatory management approach to facility safety.
1. The traditional concept and perception of the management role has
to be re-defined. It is doubtful, for instance, that middle management en-
gages in a daily process of decision-making, planning, and organizing. It is
suggested that management's real function, literally and figuratively, is to
facilitate. In other words, making it easier for employees to perform their
jobs is the real function of management. Such a role is almost totally de-
41. Id. at 154.
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pendent on loose, unstructured communication.42 A management model
based on facilitating, rather than ruling, should be adopted for the manage-
ment which establishes the facility risk management program and for the
risk manager it wishes to appoint.
2. There can be no qualifications to the communication process at any
level of the stadium or arena organization. The major factors to be consid-
ered in reducing risks are conditions of the facility environment, its partici-
pants and spectators, emergency procedures, and related information. The
ability to deal with these risks is dependent on open and honest
communication.43
3. The hindrances posed by organizational structure or delegated re-
sponsibilities have to be overcome. Usually, this means effort, renewed ef-
fort, and then more effort to make risk management work. If a risk
management program becomes the victim of organizational indifference due
to the framework of the facility or is forgotten by management under the
guise of a delegated duty to a risk manager or staff, it usually fails.
"Risk management is an on-going process. Not only must it be inte-
grated into the very fiber of an organization, but also its effectiveness must
be systematically evaluated and adjustments made as appropriate. Neither
the implementation of the plan nor its effectiveness assessment just happen
"44
42. HENRY MINTZBERG, THE MANAGER'S JOB: FOLKLORE AND FAcT 163-176 (1990).
43. BETry VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 2, at vol. 2, ch. 24 at 45-58.
44. d at vol. 2, ch. 23 at 15.
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